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INTRODUCTION
Law schools focus on teaching the importance of statutes, administrative regulations, and
the court cases that interpret them. However, in the actual practice of law, knowing about statutes
is only part of the story. Operating alongside the system of statutes and official regulations is a
parallel and pervasive system of rules known as voluntary codes and standards. Although
standards are ubiquitous and critical to the business success of many clients, particularly in
technology fields, teaching about standards is almost absent in law school curriculums. Because
of the importance of this area of practice, this is a blind spot in our pedagogy that it is critical to
remedy.
Standards are everywhere. They can establish safety guidelines (like fire codes established
by the National Fire Protection Association or building codes set by the International Code
Council), measure environmental compliance (like Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design [LEED] certification set by the U.S. Green Building Council), or most importantly in the
realm of technology, decide interoperability guidelines (like LTE, Wi-Fi or HTML protocols).
Interoperability standards ensure that products containing components from many different
manufacturers work seamlessly. Although these standards are voluntary in that they are drafted
by non-governmental bodies and compliance isn’t enforced through the courts, these voluntary
codes and standards are anything but “voluntary” if a company wants to compete in the
marketplace. A company must understand and follow the standards that other players in the
industry are following in order to create a product that integrates with the other products in the
market. However, the standard setting process is far from impartial and straightforward.
Interoperability standards are set by private members-only standards setting organizations
(“SSOs”) composed of a client’s potential customers, vendors, and competitors, all of whom have
a stake in the outcome. Most alarmingly, the stakes are extraordinarily high; the future of a
technology company could hinge completely on whether its technology is chosen to be adopted
into the standard. If not, its technological solution—and all the investment in patents to protect
it—could become nearly irrelevant as the market relies on a competitor technology instead.
IP practitioners in particular, especially those with technology clients, must understand
how to navigate the standard setting process. First, they must counsel clients through the
issues surrounding joining an SSO and complying with its membership requirements.
Deciding whether to declare a technology “essential” to a patent is a critical legal and business
decision. And more importantly, IP practitioners get involved when the technology
incorporated into the standard is patented (“standard essential patents” or “SEPs”). SSO
members promise to license their SEPs to other SSO members on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” terms (“FRAND”). This promise to license counterbalances the increased
market power granted to patent owners when their technology is adopted into a standard as the
preferred market technology. Yet, terms that are “fair” to the patent owner may not seem to be
fair at all to the party paying for a license. In addition, with hundreds or even thousands of
patents involved in any one product, negotiating each license separately and paying even a
small amount for each could end up being administratively onerous and possibly prohibitively
expensive. That being said, if those licensing negotiations break down, any one patent owner
can prevent the product from being produced and reaching the market, a concept called “hold
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up.”
Given that voluntary standards are so critical to the business realities of many clients,
particularly in the realm of technology, the lack of teaching about standards in law schools is
both striking and alarming. This Teaching Guide aspires to address this deficiency. It
describes and supports a course module on standard essential patents, with several optional
components that make it fully adaptable to the specific needs of the instructor, that exposes
students to interoperability standards and their interplay with intellectual property law
practice. Through the lens of a seminal case in this field—Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc.1— students will learn how an SSO operates, what a SEP is, and how difficult it can be to
negotiate licensing terms that are FRAND. The case also affords students an opportunity to
debate whether patent owners should rightly relinquish their ability to seek injunctive relief
once their patent has been chosen as an SEP. More broadly, the module will prepare students
to debate whether it is in the public interest to limit patent rights in certain situations, or
whether it is more important to guarantee broad rights as an incentive to innovate. The facts of
the case also raise interesting questions involving the plaintiff’s right to bring a cause of
action; how an infringer can recover attorney’s fees without proving “exceptional
circumstances;” how to protect a party’s right to a jury trial when part of the case is decided by
bench trial;2 and even whether the Ninth Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit should assert
jurisdiction over a case involving patents, especially when it involves an injunction overseas.
The instructor could explore any of these additional topics not specifically taken up in this
module depending on time and interest.

I. GOALS OF THIS COURSE MODULE
The module aims to introduce IP-interested students to the world of interoperability
standards and to prepare them to discuss the intricate but fascinating interplay between SSO
regulatory bodies and IP rights. It brings students without a technical or IP background up to
speed quickly on the issues and gives them a real-world example involving a technology that
is likely familiar to them—video games and computer operating systems. The introduction
provided by this module would be helpful to any student of intellectual property or regulatory
law, and especially valuable to students who anticipate working in a high-tech setting or with
high-tech clients. In addition, the module provides the instructor with a vehicle to challenge
some fundamental questions about our IP laws, including whether protection is necessary to
incentivize innovation and the tension between the public’s need to use technology freely and
1

The docket for the case is voluminous, but the most helpful opinion is the United States District Court for the West
District of Washington’s 207-page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (redacted) at Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). The Ninth Circuit appeals
decision is Microsoft Corporation v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
2
The jury trial issue continues to have significant relevance. In Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Communication Tech., 955 F.3d
1317, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the Federal Circuit in fact vacated the lower court decision because it determined that
the district court judge had erred by deciding compensatory FRAND damages through a bench rather than a jury trial.
However, Ericsson can be distinguished from Microsoft v. Motorola in that in Microsoft: i) the parties stipulated to a
bench trial to decide the FRAND rate; ii) there was a later jury trial to decide damages, even though the jury took the
judge-decided FRAND rates into account. The Ninth Circuit did not rule on the propriety of using a bench trial since
the parties had agreed to it. Id. at 1040.
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an inventor’s right to protect her creative endeavors. This module is especially timely given
the attention that technology litigation—often involving standard essential patents—is
receiving in the mainstream press, including with the Apple v. Samsung3 smartphone cases, and
the FTC’s case against Qualcomm alleging antitrust violations.4

II. MATERIALS IN THIS COURSE MODULE
The materials listed below provide you with all the resources needed to include this
module on standard essential patents as a class session in your existing intellectual property
class. All of these materials can be found online at https://tinyurl.com/y24ycpv5.
1.

Case study based on the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. case
i.
Cynthia Laury Dahl, When Standards Collide with Intellectual Property:

2.

Videos
i.

Standard Setting Organizations, Technology, and Microsoft v. Motorola

3.
4.

3
4

Kirk Dailey (former Corporate Vice President of Intellectual Property
at Motorola; currently Senior Vice President of Business Development
at the Marconi Group).
ii.
T. Andrew Culbert (former Associate General Counsel of Microsoft in
charge of intellectual property litigation; currently Partner at Perkins
Coie LLP and Lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law).
iii.
Steven Fortney (former judicial clerk to Judge James L Robart of the
Western District of Washington; currently Partner at the Summit Law
Group).
iv.
Judge James L. Robart of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington
Teaching Guide (this document)
PowerPoint presentation (optional—for use at the start of the class to emphasize
concepts for auditory learners and to orient students who may not have
completed the reading)

See, e.g., Apple, Inc., v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. 11–CV–01846–LHK, 2011 WL 4948567 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011)
FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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III. PREPARATION FOR TEACHING
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The instructor should assign to the class (and also read) the accompanying case study
based on the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. case.5 However, the facts in summary are as
follows.
By 2010, Motorola had amassed a huge collection of patents in the radio and telephone
space. However, it was under economic duress and had not introduced a new phone into the
market in several years. Its revenue model was principally centered around licensing its legacy
patents. As a hardware company, and because many of its legacy patents had been central to the
products they supported, Motorola was used to asking for and receiving a percentage of final
sales from their licensees for the products that incorporated its patents.
Microsoft started in the computer software industry but was recently deriving business
from more hardware-centered fields that encroached on Motorola’s technologies. Microsoft was
partnering with computer hardware companies, phone manufacturers, and even building its own
Xbox game consoles, a hugely popular product at the time. Because Microsoft had the
orientation of a software manufacturer, they were more often a licensee than a licensor of
patents, and they were accustomed to a per user “flat fee” licensing model, as is normal in the
software industry. So, the parties approached the dispute with not only a different understanding
of the value of the specific patents at issue, but also differing philosophies on patent licensing
overall.
Before the dispute, Microsoft had accused Motorola of infringing a different set of
patents not at issue in this case. Motorola now was accusing Microsoft of infringing a new set of
patents. As part of the settlement of all their disagreements, Microsoft asked Motorola to send
them an offer to license the technology they were using in the Windows operating system and
their Xbox consoles. The technology behind each of the patent portfolios had been adopted as
“essential” to two interoperability standards. One portfolio of patents involved video
compression technology useful for when Windows and the Xbox manipulated especially older
videos, and the other portfolio of patents involved access to Wi-Fi, which was useful for some
models of the Xbox.
As a member of the SSO, Motorola was required to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. It
offered to license its patents for a fee of 2.25% of the final price of the Xbox console and all
products incorporating the Windows operating system. Without responding, Microsoft promptly
sued Motorola in district court, claiming that since the offer was not FRAND, Motorola had
5

Cynthia Laury Dahl, When Standards Collide with Intellectual Property: Standard Setting Organizations,
Technology, and Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., LAW.UPENN.EDU, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7767dahl-sep-case-study (last visited March 9, 2020); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013
WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
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breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed under contract law. Motorola
countersued Microsoft for patent infringement in the U.S. and in Germany, and quickly received
an injunction in Germany, where Microsoft had its major European Xbox distribution center.
Microsoft added its expenses for defending the injunction and moving its facility from Germany
to the Netherlands to the damages it sought in the case, and added the fact that Motorola sought
an injunction over the SEPs at all to its allegation of Motorola’s breach of good faith and fair
dealing.
The court decided to consider the breach of contract claims first, so it stayed the patent
infringement action. It then decided it could not adjudicate breach until it had determined a
value for the SEPs. After all, if the breach hinged on whether the terms of Motorola’s license
were FRAND, there had to be guidance on what FRAND terms would be. The court therefore
decided it would determine the value of the SEPs in a bench trial, and then given the valuation,
let the jury decide whether there had been a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Valuation was not only a daunting task, but this was a case of first impression. Although courts
had valued patents for other reasons in previous cases, and SEPs had featured prominently in
previous cases, never before had a court waded into the negotiation of a SEP license. Because of
the competing incentives set up when a patent monopoly right—strengthened even further once
the technology is adopted into a standard—collides with the public interest to ensure a product
can make it to market, valuation of SEPs is very complex. The court in Microsoft had not only
to adjudicate, but to create the rubric to do so.
Similarly, the court in Microsoft had to determine whether a patent holder should have
the right to enjoin an unwilling licensee to stop patent infringement over an SEP. The court had
to decide: to what extent should a patent holder have some right to “hold up” the use of the
patent temporarily, in order to incentivize a would-be licensee to license at all? This
phenomenon where the patent licensee “holds out” on licensing on any terms, claiming they are
waiting for the terms to be appropriately FRAND, might give licensees too much power, given
that the patent holder is entitled to at least some compensation for the use of the patented
technology.
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PREPARING THE CLASS

Before class, the instructor should assign students to a team (half Motorola and half
Microsoft) and ask them to read the case study. Portions of some or all of the videos may be
used either before or after the class, as the instructor sees fit. The videos both clarify and
build on the information provided in the case study. These videos explain some of the
lingering questions as to the parties’ litigation strategy and also encourage students to think
about the longer-term implications of the questions raised by the case study.
The instructor should explain to the students that they should consider the following
three questions and come with factual support from the case study ready to defend their
position on each, to be argued from the point of view of their client:
1.
2.

3.

On what basis can Microsoft maintain a “breach of contract” or “breach of good
faith and fair dealing” claim? What are Microsoft’s damages?
Is a 2.25% royalty computed from the final purchase price of Microsoft’s products
a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” license rate for Motorola’s standard
essential patents, or not? If 2.25% is not a “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” rate, what would be?
Should Motorola be permitted to seek an injunction over Microsoft’s infringing
use if the parties cannot come to an agreement on a bilateral license?

The instructor might ask the students to submit their thoughts before class in written
form—even just bulleted talking points—if there is a change that they might otherwise not
devote the requisite time to prepare.

IV. RUNNING THE MODULE
To teach a class around the case study, the instructor will want to consider the amount of
time available and how to allocate it, plus ways to manage the discussion. This part of the
Teaching Guide provides the instructor with insights about time management and a step-wise
set of questions to use to guide discussion. The final section presents general policy prompts
that the instructor can use in a concluding or supplemental discussion.
The suggestions contained in this part of the Teaching Guide are based on experience
teaching the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. case study many times. Of course, the instructor
should feel free to adapt the guidance offered here to meet their own interests and purposes.
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TIMING

This module assumes an 80-minute class. However, the last section below offers some
recommendations on adapting the class for longer or shorter periods.
80-Minute Class
1.
2.

3.

4.

Begin by reviewing the PowerPoint slides. The slideshow is designed to last 15
minutes, including time to answer a few questions.
The instructor should divide the students into small groups (no more than four
students per group, groups of three work well) and give the groups 10-15
minutes to discuss within the group their answers to the three bullet-point
questions they were assigned for homework. The instructor should explain that
the groups will make a case for their client in 2 minutes or less on each
question, so they should designate a spokesperson and be sure to have
evidence to back up their position.
Reconvene. The instructor should call upon two different groups for each bullet
point question, one group representing Motorola and one group speaking for
Microsoft. For each bullet point question, after the two groups present their
answers and evidence, the instructor should present the question to the larger
class for discussion. For an even more challenging discussion, the instructor
could introduce a few of the “Questions for Further Class Discussion” from each
section. They should allot 15 minutes for the royalty rate question, 10 minutes
for the breach of contract question, and 10 minutes for the injunction question.
The instructor should use the final 15-20 minutes of class for overflow discussion
from any of the bullet points, and to begin a broader policy discussion if desired.
Broader policy questions are offered in Section V(C) for this purpose.

If there is more time
The instructor could give the small groups 15 minutes to meet. They could then add more
time to the topical discussions and increase the number of broader policy questions at the last
section of the class.
Alternative schedules for an 80-minute class
1. The instructor could drop the PowerPoint in order to add time to the small group
discussion and to each of the group discussions on the three topics; OR
2. The instructor could drop the small group discussion to add time to the group
discussions on the three topics. Although students will have more nuanced answers to
contribute to the group if they have discussed the topics first with their peers, this
does free up more time to hold the group discussion.
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For a class of fewer than 80 minutes
The instructor could drop the PowerPoint and/or shorten or drop the small group
discussion. However, for best results, the instructor should not limit the larger group discussion
time, nor the final moments to put the discussion in context by discussing broader policy issues.

B.

RUNNING THE DISCUSSION

This section is divided into three parts, each corresponding to one of the three questions
listed above to be assigned to the class to consider as part of class preparation. For each
question, I have suggested: i) the answers that students representing each client might
emphasize; ii) background for the instructor to help the class to explore the topics raised by
that question in greater detail; and iii) a few broader questions to deepen the discussion and
force the class to think more contextually.

QUESTION 1: ON WHAT BASIS CAN MICROSOFT MAINTAIN A “BREACH OF
CONTRACT” OR “BREACH OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING” CLAIM? WHAT ARE
MICROSOFT’S DAMAGES?
1. Student Answers
Motorola: Members of the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) do not
sign a membership document. There can be no enforceable contract. Without an
enforceable contract, there cannot be a breach. Further, since there is no enforceable
contract, Microsoft cannot be a third-party beneficiary of the contract and has no
claim.
Also, even if there is a contract between Motorola and either the ITU or the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”), there is an issue of whether the
obligations of the contract are clear enough to maintain a cause for breach. For
example, what exactly are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms, especially
if the SSO does not help to define them?
Further, Microsoft has no damages yet. Until Microsoft is enjoined because of patent
infringement (and the patent infringement part of the trial has been stayed), Microsoft
will not have suffered damages. For example, Microsoft shouldn’t be able to collect
attorney’s fees for defending against an injunction in a patent infringement case until
Microsoft can prove exceptional circumstances, which is the usual standard for patent
cases. Further, Microsoft is asking for attorney’s fees to compensate it for defending
against an injunction awarded by a German court. Is that allowed?
As for damages stemming from the cost of relocating Microsoft’s shipping facility
from Germany to the Netherlands, that was Microsoft’s business decision, made in
order to avoid Motorola’s rightfully-adjudicated German injunction, which shut down
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Microsoft’s patent infringement. If Microsoft had negotiated a proper license with
Motorola, it would not have had to incur that expense.
Microsoft: Besides the fact that members of the IEEE must sign a membership
agreement, being a member of an SSO and taking part in the standard setting process
sets up an implied contract to abide by the guiding documents of the SSO. Since the
contract is bilateral between Motorola and each SSO, Microsoft cannot sue directly for
breach. However, since Microsoft is also a member of each SSO, it has been operating
in reliance that Motorola will abide by SSO guidelines, and Microsoft is also a thirdparty beneficiary of the contract. So, for both of those reasons, Microsoft has a claim
for breach.
Even if the bylaws and guidance documents were not clear enough to establish a
contractual relationship between Motorola and the SSOs, the fact that Motorola
signed a Patent Statement and Licensing Declaration Form (in the case of the ITU)
and a Letter of Assurance for Essential Patent Claims (“LOA”) (in the case of the
IEEE) is an additional basis for a contract. As another member of the SSO,
Microsoft relied on Motorola’s promise to license its SEPs on FRAND terms.
As for the clarity of the obligation that led to breach, the guiding documents state that
a member has an obligation to license on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms. It is also clear that the SSOs do not decide what “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” means. So, the obligation is clear that the parties need to negotiate
and execute a license, and that they are expected to arrive separately at an agreement
on what would constitute FRAND terms.
Microsoft’s damages stem from the breach, not from the patent infringement case.
Motorola’s seeking an injunction breached its duty to operate with good faith and fair
dealing, which is a contract claim. Therefore, Microsoft has the right to seek damages
resulting from that injunction, which includes the attorney’s fees to defend itself, and
the cost of relocating its shipping facility out of Germany.
As to whether the U.S. court could consider damages resulting from an injunction
imposed by a German court, the U.S. court should have jurisdiction because the
German action involved some of the same patents that Motorola offered to license in
the U.S. contract case.
2. Background
The Rulings from the Actual Case
Judge James L. Robart of the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. case first bifurcated
the trial, separating out the patent infringement case from the breach of contract
case.6
6

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
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He then issued orders addressing the preliminary questions of i) whether Motorola had
entered into binding contractual commitments with the SSOs, and ii) whether
Microsoft had standing to sue under those contracts, during summary judgment
motions filed before the beginning of the trial. The court decided:
1. Motorola was contractually bound to license its SEPs on FRAND terms,
by virtue of Motorola’s executing letters of assurance and declarations
with the SSOs committing to license its SEPs on FRAND terms;7
2. Microsoft had standing to sue as a third part beneficiary to
Motorola’s contracts with the SSOs.8
3. Questions for Further Class Discussion
1. Should a patentee’s seeking an injunction really be a factor in deciding whether or not
there was a breach of contract (especially, as with the ITU, when there is no ban on
injunctions specifically spelled out in SSO guideline documents)?
2. Ask the groups that represent Motorola: How can you protect your client if they have
to open up a FRAND negotiation by suggesting licensing terms? Is there any way to
prevent a would-be licensee from going to a court claiming “breach of contract” and
“breach of good faith and fair dealing” if they simply don’t like the offer?
3. If a would-be licensee can use a breach of contract claim to ask the court to set a
FRAND rate, which previously was done through a patent infringement lawsuit, does
that preserve the would-be licensee’s ability to use patent defenses (e.g. that the patent
is not essential, not valid or not infringed) for a later time? Should a would-be licensee
be able to maintain those defenses, or would that be taking “two bites at the apple?”
4. When deciding damages for a breach of contract, should the court consider whether
plaintiff has actually engaged in holdup? Should presenting evidence on actual holdup
and royalty stacking be mandatory in these FRAND cases?
5. How can you tell if there has been holdup unless you know what the patent is
worth? Doesn’t determining value for purposes of damages raise the same
problems as determining value for purposes of deciding FRAND rates?

7
8

Id at 999.
Id.
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QUESTION 2: IS A 2.25% ROYALTY COMPUTED FROM THE FINAL PURCHASE PRICE
OF MICROSOFT’S PRODUCTS A “FAIR, REASONABLE AND NONDISCRIMINATORY”
LICENSE RATE FOR MOTOROLA’S STANDARD- ESSENTIAL PATENTS, OR NOT? IF
2.25% IS NOT A “FAIR AND REASONABLE” RATE, WHAT WOULD BE?
1. Student Answers
Motorola: Yes.
The comparable licenses Motorola presented had similar terms (Perhaps students
could list each and discuss why relevant).
The Motorola standard essential patents (both video compression and wi-fi) are
valuable to the standard and used by very popular Microsoft products.
A 2.25% royalty fee is only a small percentage of the whole price of the product.
The 2.25% royalty was only the starting price in the negotiation; so long as
the opening offer was made in good faith, only the final agreed-upon license
terms, not the opening offer, must be FRAND.9
Wi-fi patents allowed Microsoft to enhance their Xbox consoles and sell
Kinect systems, so the Motorola patents increased the value of Microsoft’s
separate Kinect product (relevant to Georgia-Pacific Factor 6). Microsoft
could not have had that success without Motorola patents enabling wi-fi. The
2.25% royalty is not only reasonable; it might even be low.
Video compression patents are key technology for both Xbox and Windows.
Although the specific Motorola video compression technology is a little old,
the videos it compresses are still in the market.
Motorola deserved a royalty that would be a percentage of Microsoft’s whole
unit price because in each case the patents are indispensable to the value of the
whole product. It is the Kinect functionality that makes the new Xbox valuable
and Wi- Fi is critical to Kinect. Similarly, a computer cannot function without
the Microsoft operating system, and video compression technology is an
important part of the operating system.
Microsoft: Not even close.
Motorola patents are not that important to the standard nor to Microsoft’s
products. For H.264, Motorola’s integrated video compression is an old
technology applicable only to older videos. This tech becomes less relevant
every day. For 802.11, the parties disagree on whether the Xbox even uses
Motorola’s patents. Even if it does, the patents are over older technologies that
9

See supra note 2, at 8, 14.
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the Xbox does not use often. In addition, wi-fi is only a very small part of what
makes Xbox so valuable; the Xbox can connect to the internet through a landline
as well.
The process of negotiating bilaterally encourages “stacking” because each
negotiation is done separately with no reference to the other licenses needed.
Microsoft could not pay 2.25% of the price of the end product for every essential
patent it needed to license. It would be much fairer to calculate the rate based on
comparable rates from patent pools, because in that scenario, parties do their
licensing in reference to all other licenses needed and cap the total royalty.
Rates shouldn’t be calculated as a percentage of the total price of the end
product because the patents more accurately add value to the component rather
than the whole (for 802.11 the component should be the Xbox Kinect add-on,
or perhaps even only the wi-fi capability; for H.264, the Windows component
should be the Windows OS, or more likely just the video functionality of
Windows, and in the case of the Xbox, the component should be the chip that
controls video processing, and only to the extent the chip still processes
integrated videos). In the alternative, a royalty could be a flat per unit fee that
does not rely on either a component or total end product price.
Motorola’s valuation of its patents in the abstract is also overstated; there are
likely alternatives. Motorola is basing the royalty rate not on the inherent value
of the patents, but on the inflated value the patents have gained by virtue of
being included in the standard.
2. Background
After Judge Robart decided the issue of whether there had been a contract (among many
other motions), he turned to the breach of contract claim:
1.

The Two-Part Trial. Judge Robart divided the proceedings on the breach of
contract claim into two parts. He decided that before a jury could decide
whether Motorola had breached its contract to Microsoft to provide a license at
a FRAND rate, he would first have to determine in a bench trial what a
FRAND royalty rate and reasonable range might be. Then the jury could
compare that rate and range to Motorola’s offered rate and determine if
Motorola’s offer was so different from the FRAND range that it had
constituted a breach of contract.
i. The bench trial: After setting up a careful structure (detailed
below) and then running the analysis, Judge Robart concluded the
following rates were FRAND:
1. For the H.264 patents, the rate was 0.555 cents per unit,
with a range of 0.555 cents to 16.389 cents per unit for use
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in Microsoft Windows and Xbox products;10
2. For the 802.11 patents, the rate was 3.471 cents per unit,
with a range of 0.8 cents to 19.5 cents per unit as used in the
Microsoft Xbox.11
In contrast, for example, Motorola had asked for the equivalent of
$3.00 to $4.50 per Xbox for a license to the 802.11 SEPs alone
by quoting a license rate of 2.25% of the end product price.12
Judge Robart also recalibrated the royalty calculation approach
completely, from Motorola’s original offer to take a percentage
of Microsoft’s end product price to a flat per unit fee. He
rationalized it this way, “[A] patent’s royalty rate should be
based in the importance of the patent to the standard and to the
implementer’s product. Under this analysis this royalty rate
would fluctuate little, if at all, based on the end selling price of
the product.”13
ii. The jury trial: After he determined a FRAND rate and range, Judge
Robart passed the case to the jury to decide on the claim of breach
and damages. The jury was allowed to consider Judge Robart’s
calculation of proper FRAND terms. Finding breach of contract, the
jury awarded Microsoft damages of “$14.52 million: $11.49 million
for relocating its distribution center and $3.03 million in attorney’s
fees and litigation costs.”14 The jury decided that Motorola had
breached a contractual commitment to the SSOs and that by seeking
injunctive relief, Motorola had violated a duty of good faith and fair
dealing.15 The district court also denied Motorola’s motions for
judgment as a matter of law, stating that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that Motorola breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing through both making offers that were not
FRAND and by seeking injunctions.16 Much of this evidence
supported a position that Motorola had intentionally “held-up”
Microsoft for higher license fees than were reasonable.
2.

10

The Appeal. The Ninth Circuit upheld the FRAND analysis on appeal, saying
that “in determining the [F]RAND rate and range for each SEP portfolio, the

The royalty rate for all other products using the H.264 standard was 0.555 cents per unit.
The royalty rate for all other products using the 802.11 standard was 0.8 cents per unit.
12
In addition, this fee amount is understated because in his calculation, Motorola’s expert subtracted out potential
moneys for Motorola to cross license Microsoft technology. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR,
2013 WL 2111217, at *65, *72 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
13
Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *99.
14
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting the jury verdict form).
15
Id.
16
Id.
11

WHEN STANDARDS COLLIDE WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

15

district court engaged in a thoughtful and detailed analysis, giving careful
consideration to the parties' briefing and evidentiary submissions, and to the
testimony.”17 The Ninth Circuit not only supported the district court’s result,
but it supported the district court’s procedural decision to establish the rate
through a bench trial, the process of using modified Georgia-Pacific factors to
arrive at the rate that the parties would have established in a hypothetical
negotiation, and the evidentiary weight it gave the parties’ expert evidence and
proffered alternative licensing agreements.
What Process Did the District Court Use to Arrive at Proper FRAND Terms?
Overall, Judge Robart attempted to create the hypothetical license negotiation that
would have taken place at the time the infringement began, which he interpreted as just
before Motorola’s SEPs were incorporated into the standard. First, in order to figure
out the approximate value of the patents, the court analyzed two things: i) how
important the Motorola SEPs were to the 802.11 and H.264 standards; and then ii) how
important both the Motorola patents and the 802.11 and H.264 standards themselves
were to the Microsoft products. Once the court had determined the relative importance
of each patent, the court looked at comparable licensing negotiations (including other
contracts and patent pools) to set a price range.
The procedure was guided by the Georgia-Pacific factors (as the court had modified
them for FRAND circumstances)18 and expert testimony. The court was guided
especially by Georgia-Pacific Factor 1 (comparable royalties received by patentee); 7
(duration of the patent); 9 (alternative technologies); 10 (nature of the patented
invention and benefits to the licensor); 11 (extent of use by the infringer); 12
(customary practice in the industry for licensing the SEPs); 14 (expert testimony); and
15 (the terms of a hypothetical negotiation considering the SEP context). The court
also emphasized how important it was to avoid “stacking” and “hold-up,” and thought
that the structured analysis framework it had developed would effectively address
those issues.
In order to meet the first step of the analysis and figure out the value of the
Motorola SEPs to the 802.11 and H.264 standards, the court tried to place the
patents into context. The court looked at factors including the total number of
patents in the standard, Motorola’s role in the SSO and in particular to developing
the standards, measurable advantages the SEPs contributed to the standard, and
whether or not there were alternative technologies at the time the standard was
developed.19

17

Id. at 1044.
The Georgia Pacific factors, as modified for FRAND circumstances by the court, are reprinted as Exhibit 4 of the
Case Study.
19
Stan Lewis, Valuing FRAND-Obligated Patents: An Emerging Consensus, IP LAW360, November 27, 2013,
https://www.law360.com/articles/487354/valuing-frand-obligated-patents-an-emerging-consensus (citing Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *21-64 (W.D. Wash. April 25, 2013)).
18
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As to the second step of the analysis, the court took into account whether the Microsoft
end products actually used the SEPs themselves, not just the standard overall.20
After determining patent value separately, Judge Robart turned to comparable licenses
offered by both parties to decide what the market would expect to pay to license such
SEPs. Comparables could be used to support Georgia-Pacific Factors 1, 2, 12 and 15.
However, Judge Robart leaned much more heavily on Microsoft’s comparable
licenses rather than Motorola’s. He discounted the relevance of Motorola’s
comparable licensing agreements, and instead relied on a number of patent pool
arrangements, another license, and a consulting patent valuation report offered by
Microsoft. However, realizing that especially the patent pool license rates likely
understated the proper license fee (because patent pool members also gain a benefit in
being able to cross license other members’ patents), he adjusted the rates by
multiplying them by three to arrive at his FRAND rate.
Why Did Judge Robart Discount the Evidence of Motorola’s Comparables?
Judge Robart dismissed Motorola’s comparables because he claimed that they
were negotiated outside of a FRAND context.
1.

2.

3.

The license with VTech Communications did not carry weight as a
comparable license because it included unrelated patents in the deal, and the
license was mostly entered in order to settle infringement claims. The timing
and execution of the license was also suspect because it was signed just before
an ITC hearing where Motorola relied on the license to prove the
reasonableness of its Microsoft license demands. The court also noted that
VTech had only paid “very little” under the agreement to date.21
The RIM license also included several other patents besides the 802.11 and
H.264 relevant patents, even including non-SEPS. The court could not separate
out the value of the 802.11 and H.264 SEPs. In fact, since an earlier license
agreement had given the same rate for a similar list of patents that excluded the
802.11 and H.264 SEPs, the court suspected the value of the SEPs might be
negligible. This license situation was also not comparable to a FRAND
situation because the agreement was executed to settle a threatened
infringement suit and was subject to a royalty cap.22
The Symbol Technologies licenses were not relevant because two were
entered into under duress of litigation, and they involved different patents that
had expired before Microsoft’s alleged infringement, and the last license also
included patents that had expired and required a much lower total payment
than the 2.25% royalty that Motorola sought from Microsoft.23

What Other Analyses Have Courts Used to Approximate the Value of a Negotiated License?
20

Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *53-64.
Id. at *67.
22
Id. at *84.
23
Id. at *71.
21
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Although Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. was the first case actually to calculate
suggested FRAND royalty rates and ranges for SEPs, other courts and juries have
also had to rely on various methodologies to ascribe a monetary value to SEP
portfolios. In order to show students how complicated the analysis can be,
mentioning or explaining the pros and cons of these methodologies might be
beneficial.24
1.

2.

3.

24

Incremental Value Rule – Proposed as the proper valuation methodology by
Microsoft in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., it calculates a license fee based
on the value of the technology over the next best alternative. The rationale is
that licensee should only have to pay each patent holder for the value of their
improvement over alternative technologies. Judge Robart thought the
methodology was unworkable because it required multilateral ex ante
negotiations, which are forbidden by many SSOs on antitrust grounds25 and
because it would be hard to identify alternative technologies that would be truly
comparable both because different parties value technologies differently and
because substituting one technology for another might alter the rest of the
standard. He also thought that the purpose of the incremental value rule was
met through considering Georgia Pacific factor 9, which encourages
considering the advantages of the SEP over alternative technologies. Therefore,
the analysis behind the incremental value rule can be one of several factors to
consider, instead of being the driving factor to assign value to an SEP.
Top-Down Analysis: Followed by the district courts in Innovatio IP Ventures
LLC Patent Litigation26 and in TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,27 this methodology calculates the license fee
by starting with the selling price of the good, isolating a reasonable profit, and
then apportioning a percentage of the profit to the SEP owner in proportion to
the number of SEP patents it owns as a percentage of the total number of SEPs
in the standard. One problem with this methodology, however, is that as with a
patent pool, all patents are treated equally; it does not allocate a higher license
rate to a higher value patent.
Bottom-Up Analysis: Proposed by a party (and rejected by the court) in
Innovatio, this valuation methodology calculates a per unit license fee by first
isolating the cost of implementing reasonable alternative technologies that
could have been adopted into the standard and then dividing by the number of
infringing units. The court rejected the approach because it could find no
reasonable alternatives to the technology and also approved of Judge Robart’s
assessment that methodologies that depended on substituting alternative
technologies were unworkable.

See Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages: Part 2; IP LAW360, October 9,
2014, https://www.law360.com/articles/584909/print?section=competition.
25
Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10.
26
No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
27
No. CV 15-2370 JVS(DFMX), 2017 WL 6611635 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). (C.D. Cal 2017).
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Ex Ante Benchmarking: Proposed by Judge Richard Posner28 in Apple v.
Motorola,29 this valuation methodology decouples the patent from the rest of
the SEP portfolio to focus on determining the value of the patent at the time of
a hypothetical negotiation between the parties, just before the patent was
adopted into the standard. This would ensure that the license fee does not take
on any of the value conferred to the patent by virtue of its being adopted into
the standard.30

What did it mean for the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. court to appropriately
modify the Georgia-Pacific factors?
The Microsoft court knew that some of the Georgia-Pacific factors did not apply at all
to a FRAND situation (for example, factors 4 and 5) and that several other factors
needed to be altered to take FRAND concerns into account. The Microsoft court
modified the factors to make it clear that i) when the court considered outside
resources as a reference, those outside resources would involve FRAND
circumstances; and ii) whenever calculating the value of the patent, the court would
attribute value only to the patent itself and not to the value conferred on the patent
from merely being adopted into the standard. The modifications are summarized
below. The full list of factors, together with modifications added in brackets at the end
of the factors, are in Exhibit 2 to the Case Study.
Modifications the Microsoft court made to the Georgia Pacific factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

28

For Factor 1, make sure that comparable licenses were negotiated under
FRAND circumstances
Delete Factors 4 and 5.
For Factors 6 and 8, only take into account only the value of the patent itself,
not the value added because it was incorporated into a standard.
For Factor 7, give factor low relevance, since the term of the license is coextensive with the duration of the patent.
For Factor 9, only consider alternatives that could have been incorporated into
the standard at the time it was implemented.
For Factor 10 and 11, only take into account the value of the patent itself, not
the value added because it was incorporated into a standard.
For Factor 12, only take customary practices regarding FRANDlicensed technologies into account.
For Factor 13, only take into account the value of the patent itself, not the
value added because it was incorporated into a standard.
For Factor 15, make sure it takes the value of the SEPs to the licensee into
account to avoid hold-up, and consider in the context of the other potential

869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (Circuit Judge Posner was sitting by designation in the District Court).
Id., aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded on other grounds, 757 F.2d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
30
Id.
29
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SEPs, to avoid stacking.

3. Questions for Further Class Discussion
Why is deciding “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” so difficult?
1.
2.

How do you really determine the value of the patent to the standard, and the
value of the standard to the product?
There are many Georgia-Pacific factors, and as Judge Richard Posner stated in
Apple v. Motorola, they are ambiguous, a court could not know “how many
additional factors may be lurking somewhere,”31 and he questioned whether “a
judge or jury [could] really balance 15 or more factors and come up with
anything resembling an objective assessment?”32 For example:
i. How can you separate out the value of the patent from the value
conferred upon it by virtue of it being adopted into the standard?
ii. What exactly are you licensing? Just essential patents for necessary
functionality, or also optional or implementing functionality, over
how many countries, and for how long?
iii. How do you determine which exactly are alternative technologies?
Does it matter if the alternative technologies are patented?
iv. Did the alternative technologies have to have been available at the time
the standard was implemented to be considered? Did the alternative
technologies have to have been actually considered by the SSO?

Does the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. court’s process for computing FRAND terms
make sense to you? Do some of the other tests seem fairer? Do you think any of the
processes favor either of the parties more than others? Do you favor a combined test?
1.
2.

3.

Should you base patent value on the number of other patents in the
standard? What else?
Once a court decides on the total amount of money that should be paid for
royalties (Factor 12) should the court divide the money equally, or somehow
give a weighted value to certain patents? What about if some of the patent
owners elect to grant free licenses to users? Should their patents be taken out
of the royalty analysis? How can you decide how much of a royalty as a
percentage of the whole to designate for which patent?
[For groups representing Microsoft] If it becomes the norm that the wouldbe infringer has to substantiate accusations of patent hold-up and royalty
stacking before that can be taken into account in the analysis of an
appropriate royalty, how could Microsoft do that in this case?

Can there ever be a truly “comparable” license for benchmarking purposes?
1.
2.
31
32

Id. at 911.
Id.

Are patent pools a good proxy?
Why aren’t settlement agreements a good comparable? Aren’t SEP
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negotiations similar to settlement agreements in that the alleged infringer
cannot walk away from the deal?
i.
Is it better to impose a flat royalty fee per unit or to try imposing a
royalty as a percentage of the whole? Courts have decided that if you do
the latter, that the royalty base should be the “smallest saleable patent
practicing unit,”33 but what does that actually mean?
ii. How do you tell if a patent is implemented by the entire device or merely
a component part?
iii. When considering a hypothetical negotiation for purposes of calculating a
proper royalty rate, is it fair to consider present-day value of the patented
technology? How is that relevant if the court is trying to decide what the
parties would have negotiated before the alleged infringement took
place?

QUESTION 3: SHOULD MOTOROLA BE PERMITTED TO SEEK AN INJUNCTION OVER
MICROSOFT’S INFRINGING USE (WITHOUT BEING ACCUSED OF BREACH OF
CONTRACT) UNTIL THE PARTIES CAN COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A BILATERAL
LICENSE?
1. Student Answers
Motorola. Absolutely.
Without the ability to threaten an injunction, defendants have no incentive to license
SEPs quickly, if at all. Defendants could string out a negotiation for months or even
years, all the while continuing to sell their products and benefitting from the owner’s
patented technology without accounting for their infringing use. A patent owner is
already receiving less in licensing revenue than it could probably get through a
bilateral negotiation, especially for a very valuable patent over an essential element of
a standard. Removing the ability to seek an injunction really devalues the patent.
Microsoft. No.
When patented technology is adopted into a standard, it already confers additional
value and market power to a patent owner. When that patent owner is also able to
enjoin parties that are forced to use their standard essential technology from producing
or distributing their products, the owner would be able to use their greatly-inflated
negotiation power to name their price for granting a license. This would frustrate the
purpose of setting standards, which is to allow the industry to smoothly coordinate
efforts, even if it involves the use of proprietary technology.
Recognizing the difference between a regular negotiation and negotiating in the
33

See LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Cornell Univ. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283, 287–88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)).
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context of SEPs, in its Bylaws, the IEEE specifically prohibits a patent owner from
seeking a protective order asking for injunctive relief for use of its proprietary
technology once the owner has agreed to license its technology on FRAND terms.
2. Background
The ruling from the actual case:
Motorola lost on all grounds for an injunction. The court first granted an anti-suit
injunction preventing Motorola from enforcing any injunctive relief it could get from
the open case in the German court, and then dismissed all of Motorola’s claims for
injunctive relief in the U.S. courts.34 The court reasoned that since Motorola was
willing (and actually required) to accept a license under FRAND terms for the use of
its SEPs, Motorola could not prove that it would suffer irreparable harm by any
infringement and that monetary damages would be inadequate to address the harm,
such that injunctive relief was necessary. Motorola could adequately address its harm
by charging Microsoft a FRAND license fee.
What have U.S. administrative bodies and the courts stated about whether injunctions are
proper in the context of an SEP?
Under the Obama administration, as one commentator stated in 2013, “the current
trend in both the Federal Courts and the ITC [wa]s to prevent injunctive relief unless
the potential licensee refuse[d] to take a license on FRAND terms.”35 For example,
afraid of incentivizing hold-up, in 2012 the FTC commented, “the threat of an
exclusion order could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite
its RAND commitment.”36 Similarly, in 2013, the USDOJ and the USPTO wrote: “A
patent owner’s voluntary F/RAND commitments may also affect the appropriate
choice of remedy for infringement of a valid and enforceable standards-essential
patent. In some circumstances, the remedy of an injunction or exclusion order may be
inconsistent with the public interest.”37 Finally, in a widely publicized case involving
Samsung and Apple38 even though the ITC sided with Samsung and enjoined Apple
from importing its allegedly infringing products into the United States, the United
States Trade Representative vetoed the ITC’s exclusion order.39 In that case, “The
USTR relied on the DOJ and USPTO policy statement and required that any future
ITC cases involving FRAND obligations include an examination of the public interest
factors from the [DOJ/USPTO] policy statement along with explicit findings on those
34

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012).
See supra, note 15.
36
Id. at n. 44 (quoting Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest) (June
6, 2012)).
37
Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t. Justice & USPTO, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standard-Essential Patents Subject
to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (Jan. 8, 2013)).
38
In re Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices,
and Tablet Computs., USITC Pub. 337-TA-794 (June 4, 2013) (Final).
39
See Letter from Ambassador Michael B. G. Froman to The Honorable Irving A. Williamson, USITC Pub. 337-TA794 (Aug. 3, 2013) (Final).
35
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issues.”40
However, to the extent that they have discussed the issue, U.S. courts have been
somewhat more forgiving. The general understanding that injunctive relief is not
appropriate in the FRAND context is not a “bright-line” rule.41 For example, Judge
Posner considered the question in Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.42 Although he
ultimately decided that an injunction was not appropriate, he did posit that an
injunction might have be justified if “Apple refuse[d] to pay a royalty that meets the
FRAND requirement.”43 This proposition was expanded when the case was appealed
to the Federal Circuit, which stated “to the extent that the district court applied a per se
rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred.”44 Although the Federal Circuit
went on to affirm the lower court’s denial of the injunction, and to state in dicta that in
fact it may be difficult for an licensor to prove irreparable harm given the licensor
would receive fees to compensate for infringement, the court nonetheless returned to
the applicability of the eBay factors to determine the appropriateness of injunctive
relief in a patent setting: “The framework laid out by the Supreme Court in eBay, as
interpreted by subsequent decisions of this court, provides ample strength and
flexibility for addressing the unique aspects of FRAND committed patents and
industry standards in general.”45 The Federal Circuit left the door open for licensors to
apply for injunctive relief, particularly calling out the situation where an infringer
refuses to take a license or “unreasonably delays negotiations.”46
3. Questions for Further Class Discussion
1. Should Plaintiffs with SEPs be held to a different standard in terms of their ability to
seek injunctive relief for infringement than plaintiffs with patents that are not adopted
into a standard?
2. Does the mere requirement that SEP patents be licensed on FRAND terms adequately
counteract the increased market power that comes from being adopted into the standard.
3. Can SSOs rightfully deny a patent holder the right to seek injunctive relief? Can a patent
holder contract away that right, especially through guidance documents of an SSO, as
with the IEEE, which may or may not be enforceable contracts?
4. If a patent owner does not have the right to seek an injunction, does that create a
situation ripe for “reverse hold-up,” where a would-be licensee can stonewall the
negotiation and drive down the price of a license well below its value before agreeing
on terms?

40

See supra note 15 (citing USITC Pub. 337-TA-794, supra note 34 at 2–3).
Id.
42
Apple, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 913-923.
43
Id. at 914.
44
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
45
Id. at 1332.
46
Id. at 1333.
41
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C. EXPANDING TO A BROADER PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION
Depending on how the instructor would like to use the final moments of the class, the
following are some questions that can place the discussion in context and bring up broader
policy issues:
1. Do SSOs serve a valid public purpose in the way that they compromise the
individual’s IP rights for the good of the whole?
2. Can SSOs be seen as actually supporting the individual company’s IP rights, since
SSOs acknowledge that use should be compensated (even if there can be no injunctive
relief and even if the compensation must be on FRAND terms)? Or does the FRAND
rubric greatly undervalue these patents?
3. Does the concept of FRAND have any meaning, if it is left to the interpretation of
the parties?
4. Should the calculation of a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” rate be handled
by a jury or a judge? Could a jury be expected to accurately perform such a complex
calculation? Are SEP patent cases more complicated than other patent litigation trials
where damages are decided by juries?
5. Should SSOs consider changes to their operations or operating documents to make
it explicit that when members join an SSO, they enter a contract, which contract
can be enforced by other members? Should SSOs endeavor to clarify what
obligations a member assumes under the SSO contract?
6. Should SSOs offer more guidance on what terms might be considered FRAND (as the
IEEE documents do)? Should they include an enforcement mechanism for when
members cannot come to agreement on FRAND terms? If the SSO gets more involved
in defining or enforcing FRAND terms, at what point does the SSO engage in
anticompetitive behavior or even violate antitrust laws?
7. Is it proper to try to value SEP patents separately from the value they derive from being
incorporated into the standard?
8. Does the Microsoft case embolden would-be licensees to infringe and inject enough
uncertainty into the patent valuation analysis to damage the standard setting system?
If so, what would reassure both parties that the system can work? What could be done
to improve the standard setting process?

V. OTHER TOPICS PRESENTED BY MICROSOFT CORP V. MOTOROLA, INC.
If the instructor and the class are especially interested in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc., the case brings up a variety of other interesting issues. They could be fodder for
additional discussion, or they could form the basis for a second follow-up class.
1. Jurisdiction Issues
i. Should the Ninth Circuit have been able to consolidate the contract and
patent infringement cases if the Federal Circuit has sole jurisdiction over
patent cases? Is this case really a contract case or a patent infringement
case?
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Should the U.S. District Court and the Ninth Circuit have rightly been able to
stay the injunction imposed by a German court (particularly given mechanisms
available to Microsoft to stay the injunction though the German system)?

2. Damages Issues
Microsoft was awarded its attorney’s fees as damages in a contract case for
defending against the German and U.S. injunctions. How was that
permitted, when under Washington State law, a litigant cannot get an award
of attorney’s fees unless there is a contractual, statutory or equitable
exception that applies?47 For example, in a typical patent infringement case,
under statute, an award of attorney’s fees is permitted if the defendant can
show “exceptional circumstances.” However, the circumstances in this case
were not exceptional, and in this phase of the trial, this was not a patent
infringement case. How did Microsoft circumvent this requirement?
The court was willing to apply an equitable exception that had not yet been
recognized in Washington state, namely that an award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate when the opposing party violates a covenant not to sue. The court
then reasoned that an agreement not to file for injunctive relief could be seen as
a covenant not to sue. According to the court, if Microsoft was able to show
that Motorola’s seeking an injunction violated the duty of good faith and fair
dealing with the SSO, then Motorola had had a covenant not to sue Microsoft,
and therefore Microsoft’s attorney’s fees were recoverable damages. The court
also did not accept Motorola’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine argument, which
doctrine protects parties that apply to the courts for redress against claims
based on their having filed litigation. The court reasoned that Motorola had
waived or limited its petition rights to apply for an injunction through its
contract with the SSOs,48 and therefore since it didn’t have the right to petition,
Noerr-Pennington no longer applied. For the Microsoft district court’s fuller
analysis, For the Microsoft District Court’s fuller analysis, see Microsoft Corp.
v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1192–1196 (W.D. Wash. 2013), and
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis at Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d
1024, 1047–1052 (9th Cir. 2015).
3. Right to Jury Trial
By running the first half of the case as a bench trial and the second half as a
jury trial, the Microsoft case presents interesting seventh amendment issues.
The court had to separate the appropriate questions of law and fact, and also
consider how to use the voluminous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in the jury trial in a fair way that did not violate Motorola’s seventh
amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit approved the district court’s handling of
the issue on appeal, but especially given that the TCL v. Ericsson case was
47

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1192 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (quoting City of Seattle v.
McCready, 931 P.2d 156, 160–61 (Wash. 1997)).
48
Id. at 1195-1196.
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vacated by the Federal Circuit on seventh amendment grounds, whether
determining a FRAND rate as part of a retroactive SEP license is part of a
legal or equitable remedy is definitely worth discussing. This issue is explored
in more depth in the motion for Entry of Rule 54(b) judgment at Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 5373179 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 24, 2013).
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VI. ADDITIONAL READINGS
In addition to this Teaching Guide and the accompanying case study, the instructor may
find helpful the following additional reading materials:


Most Relevant Cases











Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823-JLR, 2011 WL 11480223 (W.D.
Wash. June 1, 2011) (consolidation of the contract and patent infringement cases).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (ruling
that contract with SSO was binding and Microsoft was third party beneficiary, but
denying summary judgment because fact issues remained on whether license offer
had been on FRAND terms).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D. Wash.) (granting
preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of German injunction), aff’d, 696 F.3d
872 (9th Cir. 2012).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, redacted,
which set FRAND rates for Motorola’s SEPs).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 564 Fed. App’x 586 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(transferring appeal of contract case to Ninth Circuit).
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the
district court’s determination of FRAND rate, the decision to let the jury decide on
breach, and the ruling on attorney’s fees).



Additional U.S. Cases
 Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Communication Tech., 955 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Federal
Circuit vacated lower court opinion because judge decided FRAND rate for past
damages through a bench trial instead of allowing question to go to the jury.
Remanded for jury trial to decide damages but gave no comment on the propriety of
the lower court’s method of FRAND calculation. Lower court had used top down
approach to find that rates offered were not FRAND; also considered nondiscriminatory prong (using comparables) and found breach can occur even with
only harm to the individual company and that companies with small market share
should have same royalty rate as larger companies).
 Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Organisation v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Federal Circuit overturned district court because lower
court had determined FRAND terms incorrectly because it took the fact that the
patent was essential to the standard into account when computing value. Federal
Circuit stated that in determining patent value, the analysis must focus on the
“incremental value that the patented invention adds to the product,” not “any
value flowing to the patent for the standard’s adoption.”
 Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc. 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Federal Circuit
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overruled district court that had not modified the Georgia-Pacific factors by taking
out ones that were “misleading or irrelevant” in context of determining SEP
royalties. Also said that court does not have to instruct jury on possible hold- up or
royalty stacking when determining FRAND royalty, unless defendant shows
empirical evidence of holdup or stacking.
 Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012);
appealed to Federal Circuit as Apple Inc., et. al. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 20121548, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7757 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Court discounted the use
of the Georgia-Pacific factors as a test for deciding a FRAND rate and instead
focused on ex ante benchmarks, and denied use of injunction in a FRAND
setting through a reasoned analysis based on the facts of the case (injunction
decision affirmed on appeal, but other aspects of the ruling reversed).
 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). Court decided RAND rate for use of SEPs by class of
manufacturers, adopting the Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. framework with
small modifications to suit the facts of the case.
 Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451 RMW, 2012 WL
4845628 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012). Court allowed discrimination-based
claim for breach where "defendants have made licensing proposals to other
component manufacturers that included a different royalty structure that did not
have the effect of requiring a royalty that exceeds the selling price of the
component."


Overseas Cases
 Unwired Planet v. Huawei [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat) (Eng.). UK judge used top
down royalty calculation to determine a single FRAND rate; found no breach of
contract or anti-competition law violation unless licensor offered rate significantly
higher than the FRAND rate; not “non-discriminatory” under FRAND unless
differing rates distort competition; found injunctive relief appropriate.49 
 Xian Xidian Jietong Wireless Communication Co., Ltd v. Sony Mobile
Communication (China) Co., Ltd., Jing Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 1194 (Beijing
Intellectual Property Court March 22, 2017) (China). First injunction over an SEP
in Chinese court involving a patent over WLAN technology owned by a Chinese
company.
 Huawai v. Samsung, Case (2016) Yue 03 Min Chu No. 1382 (Shenzhen Interm.
People’s Ct. Jan. 11, 2018) (China). First Chinese injunction awarded over an
international SEP.
 Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho 知的財産高等裁判所 [Japan Grand Panel of IP
High Court] September 15, 2010, r 2010 (Ne) 10001 (Japan) (Samsung Inc. v.
Apple Limited Patent Act, Sec. 100; Civil Code, Sec. 1 para. 3 IIC (2015) 46: 124.

49

This case was upheld on appeal and now is before the UK Supreme Court, where it was argued in October 2019.
As of June 3, 2020, the parties are awaiting a decision (UKSC 2018/0214). The companion cases to Unwired Planet
are also before the UK Supreme Court (UKSC 2019/0041 and UKSC 2019/0042); the appeals decision is at
Conversant Wireless Licensing S.à.r.l. v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Case No. HP-2017-000048 (Pat.) (UK).
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Used “top down” approach to lower license terms to FRAND and denied
Samsung’s injunctive relief).
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